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Are We Ailing from Too Much
Deregulation
By David R. Henderson
mericans May be Losing Faith in Free Markets” reads the title of a
July 16 “news analysis” by Los Angeles Times reporter Peter G. Gos-
selin. “Wave Goodbye to the Invisible Hand” is the title of an August 1
article by Pulitzer Prize–winning Washington Post columnist Steven Pearlstein.
This recent trend in economic reporting actually began with an April 13 article
by New York Times economics reporter Peter S. Goodman titled “A Fresh Look at
the Apostle of Free Markets.” Goodman’s article, which I examined at length on
the Cato@Liberty blog, was full of misinformation, not just about his subject,
Milton Friedman, but also about economic thought and about the state of the
U.S. economy. The newer articles continue the trend. And they’re all wrong.
Many journalists claim that the U.S. economy since the late 1970s has been very
free, with little regulation; that this absence of regulation has caused markets to
fail; that there was a consensus in favor of little regulation; and that, now, this
consensus is fading. On all these counts, the reports are false. Specifically, the
U.S. economy has not been free since before the New Deal of the 1930s. Even be-
fore the 1930s, the U.S. economy was “mixed” — that is, a combination of eco-
nomic freedom and government regulation — and Franklin Roosevelt’s New
Deal altered the “mix” substantially toward regulation and away from freedom.
The deregulation of the late 1970s and 1980s reversed some of the regulations
that came with the New Deal and some that preceded it, but the net amount of
regulation has been much higher in the alleged era of deregulation than it was
during the post–National Recovery Admnistration New Deal. Moreover, most of
the apparent “market failures” that these articles refer to fall into one of two
categories: Either they are not market failures at all, but market successes, or
they are failures that are due to government regulation. Also, the consensus has
not shifted from deregulation to regulation: there never was a consensus in fa-
vor of deregulation. There was a consensus in favor of deregulation among
economists and a minority of politicians in the late 1970s and early 1980s, but
never among the majority of politicians. Finally, most of the problems that have
happened in the U.S. economy in the last few years strengthen the case for eco-
nomic freedom and against government control.
Consider some specifics. Pearlstein writes: For the past 25 years, the
United States has put its faith in open, unregulated and lightly taxed
markets, and there’s little doubt that, over time, that model has expand-
ed economic output and improved economic efficiency. But what Ameri-
cans have also come to realize is that the same model is less adept at
providing other things that we value highly — things like safety, fair-
ness, economic security and environmental sustainability.
There are two main problems with that two-sentence paragraph: the first sen-
tence and the second sentence.
An Era of Deregulation?
Take the first sentence. “Unregulated markets” for the past 25 years? The Feder-
al Register, which lists new regulations, averaged 72,844 pages annually during
the Carter years from 1977 to 1980. These were presumably, by Pearlstein’s 25-
year standard, the last time before now that Americans didn’t have “faith” in
open, unregulated markets. Then the average fell to 54,335 during the Reagan
years, rose to 59, 527 during the Bush I years, to 71,590 during the Clinton years,
and, finally, to a record 75,526 during the administration of that great believer
in laissez-faire, George W. Bush. It’s true that when governments deregulate,
they must announce those changes in the Federal Register, too, and so some of
the pages represent genuine deregulation. But most of the pages were new regu-
lations, no matter what president was in power at the time. So, far from moving
away from regulation, the U.S. economy became even more regulated during
Pearlstein’s alleged 25-year era of light regulation.
Of course, the number of pages in the Federal Register is a crude measure of
regulation. But it’s not the only measure we need rely on. Veronique de Rugy
and Melinda Warren, in “Regulatory Agency Spending Reaches New Height,” an
August 2008 report by the Mercatus Center and the Weidenbaum Center, found
that between 1980 and 2007, roughly the years that Pearlstein labels “unregulat-
ed,” the number of full-time employees of U.S. government regulatory agencies
increased 63 percent, from 146,139 to 238,351. During that same time, the U.S.
population rose from 226.5 million to about 301 million, an increase of only 33
percent. Moreover, according to de Rugy and Warren, U.S. government spend-
ing on regulation alone (not including compliance costs, a much bigger number)
tripled, from $13.5 billion to $40.8 billion (all in 2000-year dollars.) As a percent
of GDP, spending on regulation rose from 0.26 percent to 0.35 percent, a 35-per-
cent increase. Some deregulation.
One could argue that we need to distinguish here between different kinds of
regulation. Often people refer to “economic regulation” when they mean restric-
tions on whether new firms can enter businesses or that require firms to get
government permission before setting their prices. If this is what they mean,
then there is a case to be made that, in substantial sectors of the economy, there
is less government regulation now than before the late 1970s. There has been
substantial deregulation at the federal level of airlines, trucking, railroads, oil,
and natural gas, to name five large sectors. And indeed, as we shall see later,
this deregulation has had, on net, good effects.
What was the nature of this new regulation? The biggest growth came in so-
called “homeland security,” where spending more than quintupled, from $2.9
billion in 1980 to $16.6 billion in 2007 (all in real 2000 dollars). The second-
largest growth rate was in regulation of finance and banking, where spending
almost tripled, rising from $725 million to $2.07 billion. Together, regulation of
homeland security and of finance and banking now account for over half of fed-
eral regulatory spending.
Markets vs. Government
Also incorrect is Pearlstein’s second sentence. Free markets have done much
better than governments at providing safety, fairness, economic security, and
environmental sustainability. The reason, for three out of the four, is simple.
Economic freedom tends to lead to economic growth, as Pearlstein himself ad-
mits in the above quote, and economic growth leads to more safety, more eco-
nomic security, and more demand for environmental quality. Safety and envi-
ronmental quality are what economists call “normal goods.” As our real in-
comes rise, we want more of them. Over the 20th century, as our real incomes
rose, we workers demanded more safety. And we got it. As economist W. Kip Vis-
cusi notes in “Job Safety,” published in The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics,
as U.S. per capita disposable income per year rose from $1,085 in 1933 to $3,376
in 1970 (all in 1970 prices), death rates on the job fell from 37 per 100,000 work-
ers to 18 per 100,000. Note that all of this preceded the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration, which began in 1970. This shouldn’t be surprising. As
workers, we show our demand for safety by the wage premium we insist on to
take a given risk. As real incomes rose, this wage premium rose. Employers
found it cheaper to avoid some of the risk premium by reducing risk — that is,
by increasing safety. In short, there is and has been a “market for safety.”
The case with environmental quality is similar. Past some income level, envi-
ronmental quality is almost certainly a normal good, that is, a good that people
demand more of as their income increases. But demand does not guarantee sup-
ply. Why not? One major factor is that so much of the environment is a “com-
mons,” a resource that everyone can use but no one owns. As Garrett Hardin
pointed out in his classic 1968 article “The Tragedy of the Commons,” when no
one owns a resource, it will be overused because no one has much incentive not
to overuse it. One obvious solution is to transform, to the extent possible, the
commons into private property. This has been done with rivers, lakes, and land,
but is hard to do with air and oceans. But certainly we could go much further
toward private ownership than we have until now, turning rivers, for example,
into private property, as is done in Scotland. Scotland, not coincidentally, has
pristine rivers. So note the irony. Contra Pearlstein, one reason that we haven’t
had the environmental quality we have demanded is that overregulation has
prevented private ownership.
On the issue of economic security, the wealthier we are, the more secure we are.
And because, as Pearlstein himself admits, economic freedom creates wealth, it
necessarily creates security. Virtually no one in America ever needs to worry
any more about starving. That is in part due to the welfare state but is mainly
due to the riches created by relatively free markets. Of course, if, by “economic
security,” Pearlstein means confidence that one’s income will never fall, then
he’s right that markets don’t lead to that. Nor does government regulation. Gov-
ernment regulation of the economy’s money supply, high tariffs, high taxes, and
regulations that kept wage rates high all caused the Great Depression or con-
tributed to its length.
Freedom and Fairness
Pearlstein objects that economic freedom does not lead to fairness, but it does.
One of the fairest things in life is that people reap what they sow, getting the
benefits when they make good decisions and bearing the costs when they make
bad ones. Markets create that fairness every day. And what makes Pearlstein’s
argument ironic is that elsewhere in his article he writes that “government has
had to step in to rescue the markets from their excesses and prevent a melt-
down of the financial system.” If he really believes that these are excesses and if
he really wants fairness, why does he think that the government should bail
people out from their mistakes? Some of the people whom the government is
bailing out are very wealthy people who will retain more of that wealth because
of the bailouts. Many of the people paying taxes for the bailouts are middle-in-
come people who acted responsibly. Just what is Pearlstein’s view of fairness,
anyway?
In his article, Gosselin details three factors that are “pushing people to favor
more regulation” — the high price of gasoline, the fall in house prices, and the
dismal performance of the stock market for most of the current decade. If Gos-
selin were simply stating that these factors have made people more favorable to
regulation, he might have a point. But that’s not all he does. He seems to take the
side of those who see these three factors as market failures. On gasoline prices,
although he points out that most economists think these prices are due to
“booming global demand meeting limited global supply,” he dismisses this rea-
soning, arguing that “the price run-ups seem out of whack with demand, which
has increased only about 1% worldwide.” But Gosselin is confusing demand and
consumption. It’s consumption of oil that has increased a little. Demand has in-
creased much more than consumption. That’s why the price rose. A standard ex-
ercise in introductory economics classes is to show students that when supply is
fairly inelastic and demand increases a lot, the price will rise a lot, and the actu-
al amount produced and consumed will rise just a little. That’s what has hap-
pened in the world oil market. Moreover, why has global oil supply been so lim-
ited? There are three main factors, all of which are entirely due to regulation.
The first factor is OPEC, an organization of governments that regulates the sup-
ply of oil. OPEC was formed, incidentally, in response to President Eisenhower’s
regulations on oil imports, which discriminated against imports from the coun-
tries that formed OPEC. The second factor is that almost all oil-producing coun-
tries in the world have government-run oil industries. The third factor is the
U.S. government’s restrictions on offshore drilling for oil and on oil develop-
ment in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge. Whether one favors or opposes
these restrictions on drilling, the point is that they do constrain the supply of oil
and do, therefore, cause the price of oil to be higher than otherwise.
Interestingly, Gosselin leaves out the major price declines that have occurred in
some of the most unregulated or newly deregulated parts of the economy: com-
puting power (there is little regulation of the computer industry) and clothing
(there has been a major shift toward free trade in clothing.)
Fannie, Freddie, and the Housing Crunch
On housing prices, Gosselin claims that “the rise in house prices and the recent
plunge grew out of an almost unregulated corner of the mortgage market — the
one for riskier loans.” But in fact much of this problem arose from regulation.
Jeffrey Hummel and I detailed how in Investors’ Business Daily (“Blame the
Feds, Not the Fed, For Subprime Mortgages,” March 23, 2008). Federal govern-
ment regulation contributed in three ways. First, the federal government helped
cause the boom in housing prices by helping cause moral hazard: people taking
risks because they know that if things turn out badly, someone else will bear
some of the cost. The federal government’s semiautonomous mortgage agencies
— Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae — all buy and resell mortgages. Of
the more than $15 trillion in mortgages in existence in early 2008, about one
third were owned by, or were securitized by, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Ginnie
Mae, the Federal Housing and Veterans Administration and other government
agencies that subsidize mortgages.
Although Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were no longer government agencies
during the time period at issue, they were government-sponsored enterprises.
Many buyers of their repackaged loans, therefore, assumed an implicit federal-
government guarantee. That assumption, as we now know, was all too true. This
implicit guarantee caused less scrutiny by lenders than otherwise, which helped
drive up housing prices.
The federal government’s second contribution to the increase in housing prices
was the Community Reinvestment Act. This act, first passed in 1977 and beefed
up in 1995, requires banks to lend in high-risk areas that they otherwise would
avoid. Banks that fail to comply pay fines and have more difficulty getting ap-
proval for mergers and branch expansions. As Stan Liebowitz, a University of
Texas economist, has pointed out, a Fannie Mae Foundation report enthusiasti-
cally singled out one mortgage lender that followed “the most flexible under-
writing criteria permitted.” That lender’s loans to low-income people had grown
to $600 billion by 2003. Its name? Countrywide, the largest U.S. mortgage lender
and one of the lenders in the most trouble for its lax lending practices.
Finally, a little-noted change in regulations by the comptroller of the currency in
December 2005 acted as the trigger. The comptroller made it mandatory for
banks to require minimum payments on credit card balances, causing increases
of at least 50 percent for most cards and as much as 100 percent on others.
Many people who hold subprime mortgages are people for whom a higher
monthly payment on a credit card would be a problem. Whereas before this
regulation, many people’s priorities would have been mortgage first, credit card
second, the new regulation caused many borrowers to reverse the order. Thus
the comptroller’s seemingly small increase in regulation had the unintended ef-
fect of causing some mortgage borrowers to default.
This is not to say, of course, that private businesses never do anything stupid un-
less it is caused by bad government policy. Certainly, many actors in the private
sector put their and other people’s money at risk in absurd way. It is safe to say,
though, that in the case of the subprime mess, regulation and government subsi-
dies deserve much of the blame.
Why Regulation Fails
Moreover, notably absent from all four earlier-mentioned articles is an argu-
ment for why regulation would work or how deregulation fails. I have already
provided evidence of how badly regulation has worked in oil and in the housing
market. But there’s more to say. There are two main reasons that regulation gen-
erally works out badly. One is that the regulators have little incentive to get
things right. Indeed, when their regulations fail, they often use this fact to argue
for more power and more regulation. Astonishingly, the argument often works.
The second reason is that regulatory agencies are often captured by the politi-
cally powerful and used to stomp out competition. The recent regulations on
housing finance, for example, require mortgage brokers to be licensed. That will
reduce competition in mortgage brokering and enhance the incomes of existing
mortgage brokers.
And we have powerful evidence of the beneficial effects of deregulation. Air
fares, for example, according to Brookings Institution economists Clifford Win-
ston and Steven Morrison, are 22-percent lower than they would have been had
regulation continued. Brookings economist Robert Crandall and Mercatus econ-
omist Jerry Ellig estimated in the late 1990s that when the lower air fares are
adjusted for the decline in quality and amenities, passengers saved a cool $19
billion a year. In other words, the majority of us prefer lower fares to higher
fares, more meals, and emptier airplanes. According to Hoover Institution econ-
omist Thomas G. Moore, between 1977, the year before deregulation of trucking
began, and 1982, inflation-adjusted rates for truckloadsize shipments fell by 25
percent and service quality improved. And, of course, because of decontrol of
oil and gasoline prices under presidents Carter and Reagan, increases in world
oil prices have been passed on to consumers rather than suppressed, so that the
time-killing line-ups for gasoline in the 1970s have not been repeated.
It’s possible that I’m being uncharitable in interpreting Gosselin. Perhaps his
tone simply reflects the tone of Americans whom he sees as souring on econom-
ic freedom. But shouldn’t economic journalists, whatever else they do, get the
facts right? And the three overriding facts are: (1) we have not had a period of
light regulation, (2) deregulation didn’t fail, and (3) regulation makes things
worse.
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